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Abstract—Mobility as a Service (MaaS) applies the everything-as-
a-service paradigm of Cloud Computing to transportation: a MaaS
provider offers to its users the dynamic composition of solutions of
different travel agencies into a single, consistent interface.
Traditionally, transits and data on mobility belong to a scattered
plethora of operators. Thus, we argue that the economic model of
MaaS is that of federations of providers, each trading its resources to
coordinate multi-modal solutions for mobility. Such flexibility comes
with many security and privacy concerns, of which insider threat is
one of the most prominent. In this paper, we follow a tiered structure
— from individual operators to markets of federated MaaS providers
— to classify the potential threats of each tier and propose the
appropriate countermeasures, in an effort to mitigate the problems.
1. INTRODUCTION
The term Cloud Computing denotes a dynamic infras-
tructure where users access services without regard to
where the services are hosted [1]. The concept of Mobility
as a Service (MaaS) [2] takes inspiration from such a
model and brings it into the context of transportation. In
Cloud Computing, the architecture that runs the services
is dynamic and transparent to users. Likewise, MaaS hides
a dynamic composition of solutions provided by different
travel agencies behind a consistent interface. Hence, MaaS
users experience traveling as provided by a single agency.
Due to regulatory and logistic issues, mobility re-
sources are administrated and owned by a scattered
plethora of mobility operators (traditional travel agencies
and providers of data for mobility). Thus, we argue that the
leading economic model of MaaS markets is that of feder-
ations of mobility operators, each trading its resources. In
such a federated market, operators can dynamically partner
with each other, still preserving their individual autonomy
and without the need for a centralized regulation authority.
On these premises, we are currently developing a Service-
Oriented platform, called Smart Mobility for All1 (SMAll),
built on the concept of federated Cloud Computing [3], [4]
and purposed to support liquid markets for transportation.
1. https://github.com/small-dev/SMAll.Wiki/wiki
During the development of SMAll and through the
collaboration with our industrial partners (public admin-
istrations, local travel agencies, etc.), we identified and
analyzed many security issues spanning from a single op-
erator to a federation of operators. In this context, we deem
malicious insider activity one of the most prominent, span-
ning from standard threats against cloud installations [5]
to insider issues specific to the contexts of mobility and of
markets of services.
Motivation. Fig. 1 depicts a cross section of an instan-
tiation of SMAll, where the colored entities outside of
the boundaries of SMAll (bordered with double lines) are
public transportation agencies, private companies, on-line
communities, and MaaS operators.
Even when considered in isolation, the agents in the
platform already entail well-known threats due to insider
activity. For example, the City Bus Operator represents
a threat to the privacy of drivers since GPS positioning
can reveal sensitive information on their conduct, which
is forbidden under some legislation; however, also drivers
represent an insider threat to the Bus Operator: they can
disable the GPS device on their vehicles, compromising
the reliability of the GPS positioning system and that of
the other services that depend on it2 (e.g., the Bus Delays
service that estimates bus arrivals based on vehicle GPS
positions). Finally employees can manipulate the services
and their data, damaging the company by extracting re-
stricted information or causing outages.
Broadening our scope to federated interactions, we
focus on the MaaS Operator in Fig. 1 that, for exam-
ple, deploys a Journey Planner service for providing dy-
namic multi-modal trips to users. The service orchestrates
other federated services in SMAll: it uses information on
scheduling, availability, disruptions, and the position of
buses, trains, and on-demand cars.
As expected, the threats highlighted for single op-
erators surface (and possibly combine) to higher-level
2. The issues are far from being just speculative, as we actually
encountered them collaborating with one of our industrial partners.
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Figure 1. Example of the SMAll architecture.
federated scenarios. Consider the case in which the City
Bus Operator allows the MaaS Operator to access the Bus
GPS Proxy service. With the raw data on the real-time
position of buses, the MaaS Operator can undertake many
malicious activities to the detriment of the Bus Operator,
e.g., passing relevant information to competitors of the Bus
Operator. Another important threat comes from the extrac-
tion of sensitive information from aggregated/anonymized
data. Aware of the threat posed by the Bus GPS Proxy
service, the Bus Operator markets only its Bus Delays
service. However, also aggregated data like the temporal
approximation of the arrival of buses might let the MaaS
Operator extract [6] the actual position of vehicles (possi-
bly optimizing the accuracy of the extraction [7]).
Contribution. As exemplified, in the context of MaaS
operators, the definition of what an insider is can assume
subtle nuances depending on the considered scenario. In
this work, guided by our experience with the development
of SMAll, we describe the security issues concerning
insiders within such a federated market of services. We
develop our treatment following a tiered view of MaaS
markets, called the MaaS Stack [8], summarized in § 2. In
§ 3, we consider each tier of the MaaS Stack, we define
what an insider is for each of them, we analyze the related
threats, and we describe the possible countermeasures.
2. THE MAAS STACK: AN OVERVIEW
In this section we briefly overview the MaaS Stack
(Fig. 2), a structured view that we assembled to guide the
development of SMAll. In § 3 we use the MaaS Stack to
analyze the insider threats of each tier.
Tier I — eMobility Operators. The first tier of the
MaaS Stack is that of eMobility Operators. An eMobility
Operator is an entity that owns, administrates, and exposes
software functionalities regarding mobility, provided in
a machine-readable form. In tier I of the MaaS Stack,
eMobility Operators are considered in isolation (i.e., not
using and integrating the services of other operators).
For example, the National Train Operator represented in
Fig. 1 is an eMobility Operator that owns services for
purchasing tickets, accessing timetables, and receiving
real-time position of vehicles.
Tier II — Business Intelligence. The second tier of
the MaaS Stack still focuses on single eMobility oper-
ators but it enriches the taxonomy of services with the
category of Business Intelligence. These services are not
meant for users but for eMobility operators; they span
over first-tier services by monitoring and analyzing their
usages. Business Intelligence services provide insight on
the performances of eMobility operators. For example, the
eTicketing Analysis Service (Fig.1) of the Train Operator
can suggest to the latter new pricing policies as well as re-
porting rarely used routes that could be merged/discarded.
Tier III — MaaS Operators. The last tier of the MaaS
Stack is that of MaaS Operators, i.e., eMobility operators
that federate and integrate their services with those of other
eMobility operators. Each MaaS operator provides to its
users information and transit services of other operators
as its own. The principle resembles that of “roaming” in
GSM phone networks [9], where users connect through the
services of another phone company when traveling outside
the geographical coverage area of the home network. The
MaaS Operator represented in Fig. 1 can federate with the
National Train Operator and the City Bus Operator and it
can offer multi-modal journeys that span different means
of transportation and have nation- to city-wide scopes.
This example introduces the last fundamental element of
the third tier of the MaaS Stack: Clearing services to
account for federated usages and compensate operators
according to the established Business Policies.
To support the mentioned features in SMAll, we are
currently developing and integrating components to deploy
services, to support the definition and enforcement of busi-
ness and clearing policies, and to federate many instances
of the platform. During the development, we recognized
and investigated security issues derived from the openness
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Figure 2. The MaaS Stack
of our federated platform. In the next section, we consider
each tier of the MaaS Stack, we define what an insider is
for each of them, we analyze the related threats, and we
describe the possible amendments to counteract them.
3. INSIDER THREATS IN MAAS SCENARIOS
Statistically, insider threats are one of the most expen-
sive security issues for business companies [10]. One
prominent reason of these expensive outcomes is that
companies did not foresee all possible malicious insider
activities [11]. Indeed, the problem is not the lack of proper
countermeasures as much as the difficulty of identifying
a malicious insider in the first place. Literature abounds
with guidelines and principles aimed at providing general
descriptions of the context and the identity of the insiders
[12], [13]. However, experts agree that the strong contex-
tual variance of threats [14] makes providing a general yet
precise identification of all possible insiders difficult.
Thus, we deem useful to share the experience we
gained in the context of services for mobility (both at soft-
ware and physical level). Moreover, our background on the
development of SMAll provides insights on the possible
threats deriving from federated cloud architectures, built
for deploying, publishing, and trading services. Federated
clouds have been already analyzed in literature [5], [15],
however we deem important to include the related threats
in the frame of the emerging Mobility-as-a-Service sce-
nario.
In § 3.1–3.3, we illustrate, for each tier of the MaaS
Stack (cf. Fig. 2), the insiders, the related attacks, and the
possible countermeasures, as found in the state of the art
and implemented in SMAll. In Fig. 3 we report a table that
summarizes our findings. Agents and threats are classified
according to the categories identified by Casey in [16] and
the CERT technical report [17].
We dedicate the last paragraph of this Section to a brief
description of the methodology we followed to recognize
the threats and the respective countermeasures.
Methodology. As mentioned, adopting a precise definition
of insider may hinder the identification of threats specific
to particular contexts. Therefore, in our investigation, we
prefer to look at insiders from a general point of view [18]:
A trusted entity that is given the power to violate
one or more rules in a given security policy [. . . ]
the insider threat occurs when a trusted entity
abuses that power.
This definition hints that an insider is determined by
the role played as member of a system and related to
the deployed control rules and the pursuable malicious
goal(s). In our context, the most classic scenario is one
where the insider is within the service of the victim,
e.g., a programmer that manipulates the behavior and
the data of a service. However, orchestrations spanning
many providers, hallmark of the SMAll platform, lead to
subtle yet relevant threats. Consider the case of federated
partners. On one hand, the provider of a service exposes
itself to threats posed by members that use its service —
security issues span from misuse of information extracted
from the service to over-usages that entail unforeseen costs
or outages — on the other hand, an agent that orchestrates
services of other partners is a man-in-the-middle able to
leak private information, counterfeit data or use its vantage
point to extract strategic patterns from partners.
Regarding countermeasures, we structured our analysis
of the possible alternatives following the review compiled
by Hunker and Probst [19], encompassing the three ap-
proaches: i) Prevention, comprising the definition of strong
access control rules, data management systems (including
data masking and data camouflage), and mechanisms to
guarantee data provenance and data trustworthiness; ii)
Detection, that usually goes hand-in-hand with dissuasion
mechanisms such as techniques of data management and
service invocation that make abuses extremely expensive
in terms of computing power; iii) Mitigation, that exploits
auditing and monitoring techniques, based on machine
learning, to automatically identify and react to insiders.
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Tier Agent Agent Type Insider Threat Event Type
1 & 2
User
Fake Data Injection Sabotage
Service Behavior Manipulation Product Alteration, Sabotage
Unauthorized Guests Competitor, Theft, Activist Man-in-the-middle Attack Misuse
Developers Competitor, Partner, Disgruntled Insider User Impersonation Sabotage, Espionage, Misuse
Service Administrators Insider Impersonation Sabotage, Espionage, Misuse
Service Managers Crowdsourcing Attacks Sabotage, Financial Fraud
Activist, Competitor
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Federated MaaS Member Competitors Nation State Partner Supplier
Financial Fraud, Product Alteration
Service Behavior Manipulation Financial Fraud, Product Alteration
Composition of Unverified Services and Data Misuse, Sabotage, Espionage, Product Alteration
Denial of Service Sabotage
Service Workflow Manipulation Misuse, Sabotage, Espionage, Product Alteration
MaaS Competitor Nation State, Partner, Supplier 
Helper Service
Competitor, Untrained/Distracted Insider,
Outward Sympathizer
Partner, Disgruntled Insider,
Untrained/Distracted Insider, Supplier
Partner, Disgruntled Insider,
Untrained/Distracted Insider, Supplier
Agent after privilege
escalation
Data Leakage
- Accidental
- Data Theft
- Resale of Data and Access 
- Business Intelligence Data Theft
IP Theft, Opportunistic Data Theft, Physical Theft,
Accidental Leak
Data Manipulation, Trustability, Tampering of
Data Provenance, Data Trustworthiness
Data Analysis:
- Pattern Extraction 
- Data Mining 
- Data Exploitation trough data crossing
Accidental Leak, Opportunistic Data Theft Espionage,
Financial Fraud
Competitors, Nation State, Partner,
Supplier
Figure 3. Summary table comparing the tiers of the MaaS Stack to the related insider threats.
3.1. MaaS Stack — Tier I
As reported in § 2, the first tier of the MaaS Stack
focuses on single eMobility operators and categorizes their
services. In this tier, the ecosystem of services has a flat
structure and all members play the same role of providers,
without any interaction between each other. Here, insiders
can be pinpointed within two types: i) users authorized
to interact with services and ii) the managers (also seen
as owners) of the services. In the reminder, we call Users
the members of the first type and Managers the members
of the second one. The distinction between the two types
is trivial: while Users have limited access to data and
functionalities of a service, Managers can have full or
partial control (depending on the responsibility level) over
the life-cycle of the service and its resources.
Users allowed to interact with SMAll services can
basically pose two types of threats: i) perform fake data
injection (for crowdsourcing-based services) and ii) shar-
ing the access to the services or to the respective data.
Users can also exploit vulnerabilities to acquire Manager
privileges (configuring an Insider Impersonation threat).
However, we do not include a discussion on these kind
of attacks as they coincide with those described for Man-
agers. Regarding Managers, their main threats comprise:
• manipulation of the behavior of a service, i.e., the
computations done by a service;
• manipulation of the workflow among services, i.e.,
the flow of information among services;
• stealing data, metadata, and performing malicious
analyzes;
• exposing sensitive information.
Following the first tier of the MaaS Stack, we describe
the possible insider attacks of each category of services.
3.1.1. Information
The category of Information spans from basic services
that publish raw data (e.g., timetables or the position of
vehicles) to higher-level services that elaborate raw data to
extract new information (e.g., the expected delay of buses
whose calculation requires the position of a vehicle and
its scheduled plan). Notably, since Information services
orchestrate other services to calculate and publish these
refined data, they are subject to Service Workflow Manip-
ulation and Composition of Unverified Services and Data
threats. We omit to present these issues in this Section and
refer the discussion to § 3.1.2.
Data Leakage. Data leakage is the accidental distribution
of private or sensitive data to unauthorized entities [20].
In SMAll, both Users and Managers can cause data leak-
age. Users can share data to other, non-authorized Users.
Similarly, Users can also share their access to services,
which could lead to data leakage but also to other type of
threats like User Impersonation. As expected, data leakage
becomes even more serious when considered for Managers
that can share or steal sources unreachable by users.
Countermeasures. Data leakage poses a serious issue in
open networks where the transition of data is not regulated
nor monitored in their path. In these regards, SMAll holds
a privileged position. In fact, all communications among
the services in the platform happen through the Dispatcher
(cf. Fig 1), which can log the quality and quantity of infor-
mation required by all Users. Obviously, this guarantee
ceases when data exits the platform. The same tracing
system applies also to Managers.
Crowdsourcing Attacks. Users can perform insider attacks
on crowdsourcing services. These services handle data
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streamed from sensors and devices or through direct sig-
naling of the users. An example is a crowdsourcing service
where users can report architectural limits for people with
disabilities [21]. In this case, insiders can feed the service
with fabricated data to alter the normal behavior of ser-
vices, e.g., by directing users through specific pathways.
Countermeasures. For the sake of completeness and clar-
ity, let us start from the literature regarding “classic” threat
scenarios. Cho et al. [22] examined how insider attacks can
exploit security holes in a trusted network of sensor nodes.
This work is of interest for our platform because it shows
how even trust-based approaches, in architectures that have
to unify many nodes, are not guaranteed to prevent attacks.
In [23], the authors described how access control poli-
cies for a database management system can be exploited
by insiders when the control restrictions to be enforced
may come from different authorities. Shatnawi et al. [24]
made a similar analysis but based on the detection of
malicious usage of a data source, which is equivalent to
our case of a malicious influence of data source services
exposed by the SMAll platform.
An interesting work that can be applied to our archi-
tecture is [25]. Here the authors implemented a pool of
honeypots to catch insiders. A honeypot is an information
system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit
use of that resource. The high flexibility of honeypots —
able to play a huge variety of SMAll-compliant services —
is essential to make insiders expose themselves. Another
useful method that can be easily built within SMAll is a
reporting system for crowdsensing and crowdsourced data,
implemented in [26]. The reporting system is based on the
mapping of what the authors called Point of Interest (POI).
Each POI and its related data can be added to the system
by means of one or more reports. Reports are classified in
three different source classes, accordingly to the reputation
of the user that collects the data.
Service Behavior and Data Manipulation. As expected,
insider threats posed by Managers constitute a more com-
plex scenario. This type of insiders can access and modify
the raw data of services as well as manipulating their logic
to present altered results. Notably, since in our context the
physical world mixes with that of software services, we
extend the role of Managers not only to the developers
that can modify the actual code of the service but also to
conductors and other operators: agents that can access and
manipulate the physical devices that feed the services.
The manipulation of these services can have many
purposes from the point of view of an insider. For example,
during the development of SMAll we interacted with many
industrial partners, among which there were some public
transportation companies that provided real-time position-
ing of their vehicles. However, some of these companies
did not report the actual position of buses and instead pub-
lished fake positions to mirror the exact planned schedule.
In another case the service worked intermittently. In the
first case, the company provided fake data to protect itself
against possible penalties due to delays, in the second case
the positioning service went down for certain rides due
to drivers that disabled the in-vehicle positioning devices
either for fraudulent purposes (to avoid being scrutinized)
or even for shallow reasons such as to disable annoying
automatic voice announcements.
Countermeasures. Interesting works tackle the issue of
how to predict insiders activities. Ho et. al. [27] imple-
mented a detection mechanism for single users based on
analyzes of changes on the writing style of the user after
an attack occurred, using machine learning algorithms.
Althebyan [28] implemented a prediction model based on
graph theory approaches, to push alert once a detection
risk mechanism finds that users are performing actions that
might lead to compromise the system services.
Studies also exist aimed at discovering malicious
command execution. Among the most relevant works,
Kamra et al. [29] and Mathew et al. [30] focus on the
analysis of anomalous commands executed on databases.
In particular, they proposed a syntax analysis system
to detect anomalous queries; the former analyzed the
submitted SQL queries, while the latter focused on data
retrieved from queries. Doss and Tejay [31] conducted a
similar investigation as a field study within an enterprise,
where analysts were monitored while performing their
jobs. Again, these results can be readily applied in our
architecture, especially considering that tier I services
will in any case be monitored by probes needed to build
Business Intelligence services of the second tier.
In principle, the SMAll service deployment interface
can verify the correctness of an application before ac-
cepting it. In practice, this operation is very hard to
perform. One indicator of correctness is the compliance to
a template of acceptable interfaces for the kind of service
the application provides. However, it is very difficult to
define templates strict enough to allow sensible compli-
ance checks, but general enough to avoid hindering the
deployment of legitimate services.
Another important detection strategy that we consid-
ered is to implement a mechanism that could guarantee,
in every moment, a reproducibility of the results of a
service. With provenance certifications of raw data and
their propagation to results, it is possible to implement
a reference monitor to verify compliance between results
and expected values. In case of conflicts between the
declared results and the actual ones, SMAll could discover
what has been tampered with: the source data, or the
service logic. This detection can also feed a data trust-
worthiness rating system.
Finally, another way to check correctness is to look at
the actual behavior of the application, as it is common
in anti-malware checks. These techniques are far from
infallible, and their scope falls much shorter than what is
required in our setting. Indeed, in this context a malicious
behavior can be a subtle deviation from the correct calcu-
lation [32], which is far more difficult than the detection
of traditional malicious behaviors (e.g., damaging or self-
replicating ones). Promising techniques, which can benefit
from the execution of all the services on the SMAll
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platform, are those based on the aggregation of multi-
domain information [33], [34].
3.1.2. Travel
Services in the Travel category orchestrate Information
ones to provide highly coordinated functionalities to users.
Since the services in this category heavily rely on compo-
sition to provide their functionalities, their main concerns
regard their workflow.
Service Workflow Manipulation. Managers can modify the
expected flow of information among services for many
purposes. As an example, consider the Manager of a ser-
vice called Bus ETA that predicts bus arrivals. In its calcu-
lations, Bus ETA uses three source-services, respectively
for traffic, GPS positioning, and weather forecasts. Al-
though the Manager preserves the logic (i.e., the behavior)
of the Bus ETA service, by simply changing the workflow,
i.e., the bindings of the Bus ETA to the other services,
she can make (some) of the sources unreachable, either
completely disabling the Bus ETA service or modifying
the resulting output due to missing data.
Countermeasures. SMAll already provide tools to contrast
service workflow manipulations through the helper ser-
vices Dispatcher and Business Policies (Fig 1). Indeed,
when Managers deploy their services in SMAll, they also
define the related access rules (stored and retrieved in
the Business Policies service). Then, all workflow com-
positions pass through the Dispatcher service that logs
them and enforces the established access policies. In
this way, unexpected workflows are detected, logged, and
(depending on the access rules) forbidden. The monitoring
capabilities of the Dispatcher can also be enhanced with
techniques like [35], where the authors propose an analysis
to detect malicious workflows and [36], that employs ma-
chine learning engines similar to the ones used in dynamic
malware analysis to detect malicious workflows. Finally,
based on service specifications, we can create workflow
graphs for strategic mitigation [37].
Another promising approach comes from the field of
Choreographic Programming [38]. The use of choreogra-
phies to implement workflows among services is relatively
new [39]. We deem choreographies an effective prevention
tool that lets partners agree on a formal definition of
their workflows, which can be later compiled into their
respective, compliant services. Moreover, in the dynamic
context of SMAll, tools like [40] can aid partners in
updating their agreed workflows even at runtime (i.e.,
without stopping their running services). These updates
would be still conditioned to a general agreement and
maintain the same guarantees of the original services.
Mitigation techniques can be also developed following
e.g., [41]. The idea would be to develop a SMAll helper
service that monitors workflows and, once an attack by
an insider is discovered, it appropriately redirects the
workflow to avoid further damage.
Composition of Unverified Services and Data. In the
context of mobility, verified information is of paramount
importance. However, in a service-oriented architecture,
the tricky part to deal with is that a service invocation can
be seen as a collection of workflows. These workflows
can compose many levels of services, each processing
and modifying the data before its final destination. These
services inherently include the logic of the composed
services and, by extension, also the possible manipulations
executed by insiders. As an example, consider a journey
planner that uses a real-time traffic report service to avoid
traffic jams and roadblocks. Since the journey planner
directly integrates the information from the traffic report
service, manipulating information of the latter alters the
solutions of the journey planner, diverting travelers to-
wards certain pathways. This case presents an interesting
nuance: the insider is not a direct Manager of the con-
sidered service (i.e., the journey planner), instead it is the
Manager of a composed service (the traffic report) that
twists its contribution to alter the behavior of the planner.
In this context also trustability, provenance, and trustwor-
thiness of data and/or services should be considered as
possible targets of attacks. For example, tampering with
data provenance is a source of attack [42] that in a MaaS
scenario can see malicious operators claiming to publish
genuine data of a competitor, actually forging them.
Interfering with the certification of data trustworthiness
is another possible vector. In this case, it is very difficult
to block attacks in which, e.g., the creator advertises a
data source of given quality, but then exposes a degraded
version to keep the advantage of more precise/timely
information for herself. A related trustworthiness scenario
is that of an insider who succeeds in registering a rogue
service. For example, a modified travel planner could
deflect routes to favor or damage certain businesses; a
modified delay-checking application could hide or amplify
violations of agreed service levels.
Countermeasures. A service must support the provision
of different sources of data along with their associated
metadata (e.g., used to verify their provenance). However,
SMAll shall also provide techniques, embodied by helper
services, to transform those data into verified information.
Different approaches can be taken to support a solution
for the problem of recognizing the source of a data stream.
Literature agrees [43] that the requirements for a prove-
nance management system are: Verifiability: a provenance
system should be able to verify a process in terms of
the actors (or services) involved, their actions, and their
relationship with one another; Accountability: an actor
(or service) should be accountable for its actions in a
process. Thus, a provenance system should record in a
non-repudiable manner any provenance generated by a
service; Reproducibility: a provenance system should be
able to repeat a process and possibly reproduce a process
from the provenance stored; Preservation: a provenance
system should have the ability to maintain provenance in-
formation for an extended period of time. This is essential
for applications run in an enterprise system; Scalability:
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given the large amounts of data that an enterprise sys-
tem handles, a provenance system needs to be scalable;
Generality: a provenance system should be able to record
provenance from a variety of applications; Customizabil-
ity: a provenance system should allow users to customize
it by setting metadata such as time, events of recording,
and the granularity of provenance.
In these regards, it would be useful to deploy technolo-
gies to certify the metadata related to a data stream and
manage its validity during time and re-elaboration [44].
According to works like [45], this problem could be solved
only with the creation of a public-private key system for
data stream certification. A good reference is the system
developed in [46], describing a cryptographic provenance
verification approach for ensuring data properties and
integrity for single hosts. Specifically, the authors designed
and implemented an efficient cryptographic protocol that
enforces keystroke integrity. This kind of protocols can be
integrated as a helper service in SMAll. However, public-
key schemes are known for their significant computational
load, thus existing techniques may not be suitable for high-
rate, high-volume data sources. Moreover, there could be
the need for an algorithm for the provenance of composed
data. In some cases, data originated from the composition
of raw (or otherwise lower ranked) sources should be
accompanied by suitable metadata for verifying the prove-
nance of the input values, in a cryptographically strong
way. In the context of SMAll, it could be important and
useful to capture and understand the propagation of data.
The combination of metadata- with key-propagation
management can guarantee a good level of trust in prove-
nance management systems. Works in the direction of [47]
discuss how to support provenance awareness in spatial
data infrastructure and investigates key issues including
provenance modeling, capturing, and sharing, useful to
implement key propagation systems.
Finally, we address trustability, provenance, and trust-
worthiness of services and/or data.
Trustability needs to be measured by indicators for data
quality and service behavior. Values for these indicators
come from a variety of considerations on basic data
sources. However, it is challenging to define algorithms
for source evaluation based on data resulting from services
aggregating and orchestrating other sources [48], [49].
Ascertaining provenance means ensuring that the source
of data is verifiable, i.e., that it corresponds to the one
declared in the process of creation. Trustworthiness is
intended as the possibility to ascertain the correctness of
the information provided by a data source, which is loosely
related to provenance [50]. Ideally, but infrequently, data
samples can be independently measured by different users,
thus allowing cross-checking and error correction. For
original data, i.e., provided by its creator, the trustwor-
thiness score is usually derived from the reputation of the
creator. Clearly, guaranteeing data quality, provenance and
trustworthiness is not enough, it is necessary to ensure
that the computation is correct and that no useful results
are hidden (completeness).
3.1.3. User
The last category of services of tier I is not specific to
mobility but it contains essential functionalities for the
other two categories. The most representative case is that
of User Profiling and Management. User profiling is not
required to create services for mobility, but it has become
essential to ensure usability, to provide user assistance, and
to even anticipate and plan for the next movements of the
user (cf. Google Now3).
Data theft. Here, the most obvious threat regards the
possibility of stealing information derived from the profile
dataset, such as preferences, recordings of movements,
orders and payments.
Countermeasures. In our setting, a possible approach is
to empower the user with control over its profile and the
related access policies [51].
3.2. MaaS Stack — Tier II
3.2.1. Business Intelligence
The second tier of the MaaS Stack adds a new category
next to the ones of the first tier: Business Intelligence, i.e.,
services exclusively dedicated to provide insight on the
usage and performances of services of the first tier.
This services can implement any kind of data mining
algorithm useful for monitoring the profitability, sustain-
ability, and reliability of the provided services, as well as
for determining trends and making predictions on future
usage, for capacity planning and policy definition.
Business Intelligence Data Theft. Business Intelligence
analyzes are important source of sensitive information for
insiders (also in this case Managers with privileged access)
that could expose relevant data to third parties. Indeed,
without Business Intelligence services it would be very
difficult or even impossible for insiders to obtain such
data, that otherwise would require the access to massive
amounts of private information over long periods.
Managers of Business Intelligence services can apply
targeted analyzes to infer reserved information, such as
policies and business strategies of their company. An
example of this type of attack is what we simulated in [52],
where by just analyzing the database of validated tickets of
a public transport company of the urban area of Bologna,
we were able to reconstruct the distribution of the various
types of tickets in the different zones of the city.
Countermeasures. SMAll serves the purpose of mediating
the access to relevant data for Business Intelligence. Every
operator wishing to obtain statistics or performance indi-
cators about its own services can freely create instances of
the platform-approved analytics services.
Regarding mitigation, the most effective way to hinder
the possibility to misuse Business Intelligence services
is to properly sanitize the datasets and to control the
workflow of this information. These techniques [53] aim
3. https://www.google.com/search/about/learn-more/now/
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to prevent insiders from correlating Business Intelligence
services with external data sources to derive hidden pat-
terns or de-anonymize sensitive information.
3.3. MaaS Stack — Tier III
The third tier of the MaaS Stack is that of MaaS operators,
i.e., eMobility operators that use services of other compa-
nies, traded within a federated market. In our case, SMAll
gives support to such a market but the creation of dynamic
federations of MaaS operators rises specific threats within
SMAll (and MaaS markets in general).
In this scenario the main issues to consider are:
• Data service management to avoid manipulation, im-
personation, and sensitive pattern discovery (Preven-
tion and Detection);
• Service workflow management to monitor invocation
trends of services (Mitigation and Detection);
• Service quality and trustability management to verify
the correctness of the service results (Prevention and
Detection).
Indeed, the PaaS layer in SMAll differs from most PaaS
solutions. Traditionally PaaS provides offer execution en-
vironments that isolate tenants. On the contrary, SMAll is
built to ease the publication, integration, and orchestration
of services owned by different operators.
A simple example to clarify this characteristic is a one-
stop ticketing application that orchestrates:
• a dynamic planner service providing routing options;
• a user profile manager to sort them according to user
preferences;
• a real-time availability seat reservation service;
• a set of services for payment.
The hierarchy of the ticketing service spans many
layers, e.g., it integrates the dynamic planner that, in turns,
orchestrates many services for static (mapping, timetables)
and real-time data (delays, planned extraordinary events,
disruptions). The composition of services forms a tree of
dependencies that reaches the level of raw-data informa-
tion services, possibly branching within the domains of
different companies.
Since SMAll aims at supporting this kind of interop-
erability, we argue that it shall also assume responsibility
for the trustworthiness and reliability of the services; this
is unusual for traditional PaaS [54]. Moreover, access
control policies can be heterogeneous, exchanged data can
have different sensitivity levels, and the agents can be
competing operators.
Clearly, the main insider threat for this scenario comes
from the service providers themselves, the MaaS opera-
tors. The malicious goals can be of various kinds, spanning
from the de-legitimization of services of competing oper-
ators, to the theft of stored information such as policies
or business strategies, to insiders that apply mining tech-
niques to infer these information using the data available
from their vantage point.
We now proceed by focusing our analysis on the
relevant insider threats within the categories of the third
tier of the MaaS Stack.
3.3.1. Roaming and Clearing
SMAll aims at providing interoperability between different
operators. In this context, interoperability means that it is
possible to implement ticketing systems which seamlessly
work on different operators across their zones of influence.
As mentioned in § 2, this concept (and the category of
services that supports it) takes the name of Roaming.
Usually, to support at a business level the roaming for users
among operators, business agreements should be put into
place to implement a Clearing system for the redistribution
of profits between transport operators. In this Section, we
consider threats as directed to the Clearing category since
it comprises also the threats to the Roaming one.
Pattern Extraction. As analyzed in [52], the need
for Clearing services is satisfied through a centralized
(federation-wise) system able to collect all the different
data sources from different operators and to perform eco-
nomic evaluations. A centralized clearing system scenario
is typically based on a central database that collects all the
ticket validation data from every public transport operator.
This database is used both to perform economic evalua-
tions to redistribute profits and to store a permanent proof
of the validity of this evaluation. The clearing system must
fulfill an effective trade-off between public verifiability of
the correctness of its operation and protection of sensitive
data provided by operators. As the last cited work shows,
an insider can perform data mining analysis and pattern
discovery on the tickets datasets in order to retrieve sen-
sitive information about business strategies and perform
unfair competition.
Countermeasures. To counteract Pattern Extraction, it is
possible to deploy sanitization techniques [55] able to
mask the data enough to deny the possibility to perform
pattern analysis. These sanitization techniques balance
masking sensitive data and keeping enough properties and
information required to perform the economic evaluations.
In order to do what we described, we could assemble an
anonymization system, that combines masking techniques
for the raw dataset (once deployed in the centralized
database clearing system) and a differential privacy engine
able to introduce a certain amount of noise and prevent
exploit techniques as cross-combining data with external
ones.
3.3.2. Access Control and Service Level Agreement
Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Access Control (AC)
services in SMAll are meant to throttle the invocation of
tier I services provided by an operator on the basis of
commercial agreements with other operators. It is possible
to see SLA as a contract ruling the quantity or rate of
invocation of each service, and AC as a contract ruling the
quality or the set of provided data or services. Obviously,
malicious insiders may try to circumvent these limitations.
Countermeasures. When a SLA or an AC policy is in
place, all service invocations must be tracked (or even
proxied) by an infrastructural service provided by SMAll.
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This makes evading enforcement difficult. The most com-
mon vulnerability in this context is not tied to policy en-
forcement, however, but rather to policy specification. To
this end, SMAll could restrict acceptable policies to those
drafted with an internal helper service, following a stan-
dard framework, and formally verifying their soundness
before applying them. Access control models and formal
policy specification languages have been around for some
time [56], [57], and they have evolved into sophisticated,
standardized models like ABAC [58], [59]. Inadequate (but
consistent) policy definitions due to poor understanding
of the federation interactions or to carelessness cannot
be tackled at this level; logging and auditing facilities
integrated in SMAll provide valuable feedback at run-time
about the effectiveness of installed policies.
3.3.3. Business Intelligence
Similarly to tier II, in tier III we have a category of
services dedicated to business intelligence. The difference
with respect to the services of the second tier is that
here the analyzes span data belonging to a multitude of
operators. Indeed, as it happens for clearing services, the
business intelligence services of the third tier relate to
the management of data, statistics, and administration of
services shared among operators. The availability of such
aggregated data can give free access to companies (seen
as federated insiders) to data and analyzes of competitors.
Referring again the case of the dynamic route planner as
a running example, the service can use real-time data of
different companies to take into account the average delays
of transport vehicles in the calculation of its solutions. The
averaged delays are the result of a business intelligence
service that collects all the delays of a route within a
specific area that involves several operators and calculates
the delays. Finally, the recorded delays are collected into
a shared dataset accessible by all the participants.
In this example, an insider can use the collected dataset
to find out where the competitors operate with bigger
delays and profit from this information by exposing their
faults to the regional administration. Insiders can also
expose cartels where operators systematically provide a
bad service during rush hours to favor a specific company
(e.g., because they hold some economic interest in it).
Finally, the insiders can also find out if an operator hides
delays making analysis on the correspondent road condi-
tions (e.g., showing that buses could not sustain certain
speeds since their routes were jammed).
Countermeasures. All the countermeasures for this kind
of attacks are based on a trade-off between the amount of
sensitive data preserved and utility of the queries. Different
anonymization and sanitization techniques have been pro-
posed for complex datasets, but since in SMAll Business
Intelligence services share the results of queries, we need
to introduce a measure that indicates the maximum amount
of anonymized information such that the queries still work.
Different works proposed metrics for the evaluation of
the amount of privacy preserved in specific dataset. A mea-
sure introduced in [60] defined an evaluation metric about
the presence of pattern in a dataset called δ -presence. We
can use this metric to evaluate the presence of a specific
patterns in the shared dataset. Another interesting work
in this direction is [61] which operates by complementing
existing techniques with post randomization methods.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented the concept of Mobility as
a Service and how MaaS operators shall facilitate the
dynamic provisioning of multi-modal transportation to
their users. To support such flexibility we are developing a
federated marketplace of services called SMAll, aimed at
harmonizing data flows and service invocations.
This kind of federated platform is particularly sensitive
to insider threats, which emerge at different layers, target-
ing both the constituent components provided by users and
operators and the services provided by the platform itself.
The MaaS Stack, our tiered view on the components
of MaaS markets, allowed us to treat in isolation the
security issues of each tier. Often, these issues turn out
to be instances of well-known threats in the fields of cloud
computing, service-oriented architectures, supply chain
management, and trusted business partnerships.
In principle, the platform allows to implement context-
specific versions of the solutions proposed in the literature
regarding the aforementioned fields, as well as novel so-
lutions inspired by their cross-fertilization. We argue that
the central role of SMAll in mediating every interaction
and in collecting their traces makes the platform fit to host
solutions to the presented security issues of MaaS markets.
The effectiveness of the proposed approaches will
be experimentally validated in the near future, following
the completion of the platform in all its parts, and the
deployment of real-world services on it.
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